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Reforming birth registration law in England
and Wales?
Julie McCandlessLondon School of Economics, London, UKDr Julie McCandless is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Law, London School of Economics, where she
teaches medical and family law. Her research specialises in the legal regulation of human reproduction, parenthood
and gender. She is co-director of the Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments Project and sits on the Editorial Board of
Feminist Legal Studies.Abstract The Law Commission of England and Wales is considering what its 13th Programme of Law Reform should address.
During the consultation process, a project on birth registration law has been mooted. This is a very welcome proposal given that
civil birth registration in England and Wales is a compulsory procedure that not only finds its roots in the early Victorian era, but
also remains very similar, at least in terms of form and the information that is recorded. I first use two recent legal challenges to
illustrate why the current system is coming under increasing pressure. I further use these examples to caution against a law reform
agenda that is narrowly focused on the precise information recorded, without a preliminary and wider examination of what the
role and purpose of birth registration is, and should be, in society. I argue that this needs to be addressed before the state can
justify the parameters of the information recorded. I then use an outline of historical reforms relating to the registration of births
outside of marriage to highlight the normative two-parent family model that underpins the birth registration system. I argue that
legal reform must be cognizant of the tenacity of this normative family model, particularly in relation to reform proposals
surrounding donor conception and the annotation of birth certificates. Finally, I draw attention to wider developments in family
law that cast birth registration as a social policy tool for the facilitation of parent–child relationships, particularly unmarried
fathers.
© 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1 According to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority’s
most recent statistics, live birth rates in fertility clinics in 2013 were
as follows: 589 following in-vitro fertilization (IVF) with donated
sperm; 597 following IVF using donated eggs; and 590 following
donor insemination (HFEA, 2014). The statistics do not detail the
number of live births following donated embryo transfer, nor do
they detail donor insemination births that take place in a non-
clinical setting.
2 For example, in Torfaen County Council in Wales, residents
applying for the nappy collection service as part of their fortnightly
waste collection must provide a copy of their child(ren)’s birth
certificate [http://www.torfaen.gov.uk/en/RubbishAndRecycling/
Householdwaste-domesticbins/YellowBag/Yellow-Bag.aspx (last
accessed 8 May 2017)].
3 Note that the Law Commission requires confirmation from a
government department that it has a 'serious intention' to take law
reform forward before it can include a project in its programme. At
this stage, we can only speculate on whether the Law Commission
have mooted a project on birth registration law in their 13th
Programme at the suggestion of a government department and
which department it might be.
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The Law Commission of England and Wales is currently
considering what its 13th Programme of Law Reform should
address. During the consultation process, a project on birth
registration law and certificates has been mooted. This is a
very welcome proposal. Civil birth registration in England
and Wales is a compulsory procedure that not only finds its
roots in the early Victorian era, but also remains very
similar, at least in terms of form and the information that is
recorded. In this short commentary, I first use two recent
legal challenges to illustrate why the current system is
coming under increasing pressure. I further use these
examples to caution against a law reform agenda that is
narrowly focused on the precise information recorded on a
birth certificate, particularly in relation to parenthood. This
is not to suggest that the information recorded should not be
reconsidered, but rather that the scope of a law reform
project on birth registration needs to be wider given the
normative family model which underpins the system.
I then draw particular attention to the wider family law
and policy context within which birth registration operates,
and ask what this means in relation to the information
recorded. I outline reforms relating to the registration of
births outside of marriage to demonstrate that, while
historical changes could be interpreted as being a bit
haphazard, they have, in fact, always been informed by
the normative two-parent family model. I argue that legal
reform cannot ignore this tenacious normative dimension,
given the extent to which it shapes how the familial
information on a birth certificate is understood. I also point
to changes in the Adoption and Children Act 2002 and the
Welfare Reform Act 2009 – relating to the joint birth
registration of births outside of marriage – to show how birth
registration has been conceptualized in recent times by the
state as a social policy tool that facilitates a parent–child
relationship. I argue that this imbues birth registration with
even further significance in terms of ‘textually mediated’
statecraft (Breckenridge and Szreter, 2012), for it means
that registration is significant for purposes beyond ‘recogni-
tion’. Legal reform must be cognizant of this growing role of
bureaucracy and ‘paperwork’ in the state’s efforts to
organize and determine family practices and behaviour. I
conclude that a law reform process underpinned by these
wider considerations should be very much welcomed as a
way of progressively considering what role this compulsory
civil registration procedure can and should play in contem-
porary and future society.
Challenging times for birth registration
It has been almost a decade since the Joint Committee
scrutinizing the Human Tissues and Embryos (Draft) Bill (2007)
recommended that, 'as a matter of urgency', the Government
give consideration to rights that may be implicated in state
authorities holding personal information – namely details of
gamete donors – and the information that appears on birth
certificates [House of Lords andHouse of Commons Committee
on the Human Tissue and Embryos (Draft) Bill, 2007: 276]. No
government has responded to this recommendation. This is
perhaps not surprising as, while donor conception is notuncommon, it affects only a relatively small proportion of the
population.1 However, the existence of a similar minority
demographic represented by mother-only registered births
(around 7% of births registered each year; Wallbank, 2009: 1)
did not prevent the enactment of quite considerable reforms
in relation to the compulsory joint registration of births
outside of marriage in the Welfare Reform Act 2009 (Schedule
6; on the detail of the reforms, see below). However, the fact
that these reforms have never been implemented points to a
further – arguably more likely – reason why the Joint
Committee’s recommendation has been gathering dust; that
to reform the law relating to birth registration and certificates
is a complex task. The interplay between public and private
information is politically sensitive, and the myriad uses for a
birth certificate – including passport application, genealogical
research, application for school entrance and local authority
services2 – makes it difficult to determine the most obvious
government department for such an undertaking. The Law
Commission, as a non-political entity, is therefore well placed
to start considering how this complex area of law might be
reformed.3
In relation to the scope of a possible law reform project, I
was very pleased to see the Law Commission cast this in
wider terms than the Joint Committee recommendation.
Any attempt to reform this one area of birth registration law
is likely to prove unsatisfactory, given that the issue of
whether birth certificates should indicate that a person is
donor-conceived and/or include the name(s) of the gamete
provider(s) continues to prove highly controversial and often
polarized. In my view, this stems not only from different
values being placed on genetic relationships, but also from
different understandings of the purpose of birth registration.
To say this is not to suggest that the issue should not be
included in a law reform programme, particularly in light of
the depth of feeling that it evokes. However, two recent legal
challenges signal that a much wider review is warranted. The
first of these cases appears, on the surface, to fit closely with
the Joint Committee’s concerns. In 2014, Emma Cresswell had
her birth certificate re-issued without the name of the man
originally recorded as her father, who she had assumed was
her biological father. Her legal action followed an argument
54 J McCandlesswhereby he disclosed that she and her two brothers had been
conceived through sperm donation (Crossley, 2014; Rowley,
2014). She was 19 when this argument took place and she
campaigned for almost 6 years to have her birth certificate
re-issued. In media interviews, Emma Creswell has indicated
that she is now part of a wider campaign group that wants
birth certificates to record that a person was donor-conceived
(Crossley, 2014; Rowley, 2014). However, her specific legal
campaign was never going to achieve that, at least not
directly.4 This allows us to interpret her campaign as being
about a wider issue, which is the extent to which people see –
and want to see – their birth certificate reflect their lived
familial experience. Emma did not have a close relationship
with the man recorded as her father, having had little contact
with him for most of her childhood (Crossley, 2014; Rowley,
2014). While her campaign was clearly prompted by finding
out that she did not share a genetic relationship with him, the
context of their relationship may also have been a motivating
factor. We should therefore be cautious about reading her
legal challenge in a reductive way, not least because it taps
into a growing dissatisfaction with the prescriptive nature of
what is recorded on birth – and other– certificates in contexts
whereby individuals feel that their subjective experience and
lived realities are ‘inaccurately’ represented, or they seek
official recognition of a life event.5 While donor conception
and other collaborative6 reproductive practices such as
surrogacy seem to present the most direct challenges to the
purpose and form of birth registration and certificates, my
second case example demonstrates that challenging encoun-
ters with the current birth registration system are much wider
in scope.
In a recent High Court case, a trans woman known as JK
challenged the legal requirement that she be recorded as
‘father’ on her children’s birth certificates. Despite self-
identifying and living her life as a woman, in the absence of a
gender recognition certificate – which takes some time to
acquire (see further Grabham, 2010) – JK was legally regarded
as male, as per her original birth certificate {JK v Register
General for England andWales [2015] EWHC 990 (Admin)}.7 To4 It therefore differs from previous legal cases, such as Joanna
Rose’s judicial review case against the UK’s donor anonymity policy
(Rose v Secretary of State for Health and the HFEA [2002] EWHC
1593), which more directly challenged state obligations relating to
the management of personal data.
5 Examples beyond donor conception and legal parenthood include
campaigns by intersex and transgender persons for more responsive
gender recognition (Cooper and Renz, 2016: 484); campaigns for
death certificates to be replaced by birth certificates following a
stillbirth (Sanger, 2010); and campaigns for certificates registering
the early pregnancy loss of a miscarriage (Pearlman and Foster,
2015).
6 I use this term to denote families whereby more than two persons
‘collaborate’ to have a child together, sometimes with the joint
intention of raising the child together.
7 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the contested
relationship between sex and gender, beyond noting that birth
registration in England and Wales records a person’s ‘sex’ as either
‘male’ or ‘female’. It is also beyond the scope of this paper to
analyse the relationship of ‘sex’ registration to ‘gender re-
assignment’ in the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (see further Cowan,
2005). On the possibility of eliminating the role of state law in
determining and assigning a person’s sex/gender, see Cooper and
Renz (2016).complicate matters further, JK’s male name was recorded on
her first child’s birth certificate, while her female name
appeared on her second child’s. Finally, while Emma Cresswell
was conceived through clinically assisted means, JK’s children
were conceived through sexual intercourse with her partner
before JK commenced female hormonal treatment. JK’s case
therefore highlights the wider reach of challenges to the birth
registration system beyond assisted reproduction. It also
highlights the challenging interplay of prescriptively recorded
details, with the more fluid reality of gender identity, family
connections and naming practices; or at least the difficulties
presented by a record that remains fixed in time, but which
must be used throughout the life-course. Birth registration
also records places, occupations, dates and adult legal
relationships, none of which are beyond contestation.
Any standardized written record of vital events will
inevitably flatten subjectivities and the richness of an
individual’s personal narrative. However, what these two
cases demonstrate is that individuals are increasingly prepared
to challenge the birth registration systemwhen they regard the
information recorded as ‘inaccurate’. For both EmmaCresswell
and JK, this was, in part, motivated by the fact that other
people see birth certificates for a wide variety of reasons, and
thus have access to the information recorded. JK’s case also
came about quite simply because birth registration was not
straightforward for her family. While cases like JK’s may seem
exceptional in the context of an administrative procedure that
works for most people, this does not mean that they are
unimportant, for not only do they highlight the particular
difficulties and injustices for the individuals involved, but they
also illuminate wider problems with law and a compulsory civil
procedure such as birth registration.
Thinking about how birth registration law could and
should be reformed is undoubtedly a complex task. In its
consultation, the Law Commission asked a number of
questions relating to the specifics of the information that is
recorded on a birth certificate. These are all important
questions to be addressed. However, the Commission also
posed two more principled questions: What is the purpose of
a birth certificate? For whose benefit is the record kept?
While it would be naïve to think that we could completely
future-proof how birth registration comes to be understood
in society, effective legal reform must be underpinned by a
principled consideration of its role and purpose in contem-
porary society, for only then can we determine and justify
the parameters of the information that should be recorded.
By addressing questions such as these, the Law Commission
would be making a good start in instigating a durable – as
opposed to piecemeal – law reform process of what is
essentially an early Victorian system. It is to the history of
birth registration and reforms relating to the registration of
births outside of marriage that I now turn.Birth registration law and historic reform
There has been a centralized system of civil birth registra-
tion in England and Wales8 since 1837, following the Births
and Deaths Registration Act 1836 (the 1836 Act) (see further8 The systems in Scotland and Northern Ireland are similar but
separate.
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tion Act 1874 (the 1874 Act) made the registration of births
compulsory by placing a legal duty on certain ‘informants’ to
notify the local Registrar of a birth.9 The current law
governing birth registration is the 60-year-old Births and
Deaths Registration Act 1953 (the 1953 Act), which – rather
quietly – celebrated its diamond jubilee around the same
time as Queen Elizabeth II. This legislation has seen little by
way of reform, and in comparing my birth certificate with
that of my (almost sexagenarian) mother, there is very little
difference in the information recorded – my mother’s ‘usual
address’ was recorded on my birth certificate, while her
father’s address was recorded on hers – not least because I
was born before 1986 which is when the mother’s occupation
started to be recorded as well as the father’s.10 The main
amendments to the 1953 Act relate to the incorporation of
‘female parents’ following changes enacted by the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, and a multiplication
of the documentation that can be provided by an unmarried
father when he cannot attend in person to register his child’s
birth with the mother (see Children Act 1989). However,
other than permitting two female parents to be named on
the birth certificate, the information recorded has remained
fairly constant; to include a space for the mother’s ‘maiden
name’ if different from her surname following civil partner-
ship or marriage to her female partner, as has been
traditional for heterosexual couples.
When viewed in this light, it is easy to see the birth
registration system as rather rigid and failing to keep up with
modern family life; to a large extent, this is true. However, a
brief historical examination of how the system has been
reformed in relation to births outside of marriage provides
examples of the civil birth system being remoulded in response
to changing societal mores. The introduction of civil birth
registration has its roots in a local system of parish registration
introduced by Thomas Cromwell (see further Szreter, 2012).
Although recording the religious rites of baptism, marriage and
burial, this parish system was more concerned with recording
and facilitating property rights and inheritance than it was
with religious doctrine (Higgs, 2004). As a consequence, the
1836 Act made no provision for the recording of a ‘putative
father’, as what mattered was establishing a legitimate line of
descent.11 However, the 1874 Act introduced provisions to
record the father’s name if he attended to register the birth
with the mother. In the 1953 Act, this extended to also being
recorded without attending in person, so long as some form of
legal paperwork – such as a statutory declaration and, later, a
parental responsibility agreement or order under the Children
Act 1989 – was submitted by the mother. These changes, in
part, provided some sort of state recognition to an unmarried
father who was willing to acknowledge his ‘illegitimate’ child9 The following people can act as an informant: mother; father;
occupier of the house where a child is born; any person present at
the birth; and a person having charge of the child.
10 Note that while a father’s name and occupation is recorded on a
marriage certificate in England and Wales, no details are recorded
for a bride or groom’s mother. This was the subject of a recent
campaign directed at Members of Parliament (https://www.
change.org/p/mothers-names-should-be-on-marriage-certificates).
11 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this
important point.(on the role of registration and recognition, see Breckenridge
and Szreter, 2012). The Legitimacy Act 1926 introduced a
requirement to ‘re-register’ a birth following the marriage of
the child’s parents, thus ‘legitimizing’ the child in the eyes of
the law.
It is difficult for persons of my generation and younger to
fully appreciate the effects of an illegitimate birth and
illegitimacy. However, these were clearly stigmatizing and
severe, and in 1947, we arguably see an official sensitivity to
these stigmatizing effects with the introduction of the ‘short’
birth certificate. These certificates record only the name, sex,
date and place of birth, without disclosing any parental details.
Although the utility of the short birth certificate may be
questionable today, given that the long birth certificate is
increasingly requested for identification purposes,12 the short
version has probably been very useful in the past for enabling
persons to keep the circumstances of their family private.
However, I have a differentmotivation formentioning the short
birth certificate, which is to question whether the introduction
of a documentary mechanism that enables individuals to keep
this information private is in tension with the increasing ability
of unmarried fathers to be recorded on the birth certificate?
The answer may be a straightforward ‘no’, given the
qualitative difference between making information available
to the persons it is about, in contrast to the world at large.
However, as with most things, I suspect there were other issues
at play. For example, there may have been some value in
having this information recorded, either for the purpose of
statistical analysis or the provision of child maintenance. Or,
the explanation could be something more normative, given
that the registration located the child within a family unit that
at least resembled the normative two-parent marital family.
This explanation seems particularly significant given that
the most recent legislative reforms to the system have
further facilitated the registration of unmarried fathers by
removing the need for legal documentation in the case of
voluntary joint birth registration with the child’s mother
(Adoption and Children Act 2002, s 111), and by introducing
compulsory joint birth registration in all but a narrow range
of exceptional cases (Welfare Reform Act 2009, Schedule 6).
I discuss this normative dimension further below. For now, I
want to end this historical outline by noting that the
requirement to ‘re-register’ a birth following the marriage
or civil partnership of the child’s parents still forms part of
the current legislative framework.13 This seems really odd in
an era where we have abolished direct legal distinctions
between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ children.
Future reform?
From my brief exploration of reforms relating to the
registration of births outside of marriage, I want to make
four observations. The first is that where there is political will,12 For example, if you were born in the UK on or after 1 January
1983, you will need your long birth certificate in order to apply for a
first adult passport. If you were born before this date, your short
birth certificate will suffice.
13 Although it would, of course, be interesting to research how
many parents do actually re-register their child’s birth. My
anecdotal research with family and friends would indicate that very
few do so.
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complexity of the task. This should remove any notion that
reforming what might seem for many to be an intuitive,
ingrained and straightforward procedure would be overly
difficult or confusing, and somehow not worth the effort, time
or costs involved. The ongoing requirement to re-register an
‘illegitimate’ birth is, by itself, a clear enough signal that
reform of this 'old-age pensioner' of the statute books is
needed, before even starting to think through the challenges
heralded by developments in assisted and collaborative
reproduction.
The second observation is that historical reform of birth
registration law could be interpreted as being a bit haphazard,
in that different trends – such as the registration of more
unmarried fathers on birth certificates and the introduction of
short birth certificates – seem to occur along similar time
trajectories. I mention this as I think it will be an observation
that will be invoked in relation to the extent to which genetic
parentage is recorded on a birth certificate. Here, there is
potential for the increasing ability of unmarried (genetic)
fathers to register their connection to a child to be pitched as
in tension with the parenthood provisions of the Family Law
Act 1987 and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
1990, which made explicit provision for non-genetic parents –
male or female – to be registered as legal parents, with no
indication on a birth certificate that the child was conceived
through donor conception. However, this seems to be only a
partial telling of a story, which perhaps finds its origins in the
inaccurate characterization by the Warnock Committee of the
birth register 'as a true genetic record' (Warnock, 1984: 4.21).
While it is fair to say that the parents recorded on a birth
certificate have often been a child’s genetic parents, there is
very little evidence that birth registration was ever meant to
confer certainty about genetic parentage. While wemay want
to deliberate on whether a future system could or should
confer this certainty, it would be disingenuous to start this
discussion with the argument that this has always been the
purpose of birth registration until legal changes heralded by
assisted reproduction took place. The picture is more complex
in that what the process recorded in terms of parenthood was
a legally prescribed relationship, at birth, to the child whowas
being registered. While legal presumptions operated – and
continue to operate – to confer parental status on certain
persons who may have a biogenetic connection to a child,
these presumptions have never guaranteed the presence of a
genetic connection, particularly in relation to fatherhood.
Furthermore, in terms of birth certificates not acknowl-
edging the role of donor – or otherwise assisted – conception,
comparisons are often made with adoption and parental order
certificates, which record a transfer of legal parenthood in the
context of adoption and surrogacy, respectively. In both
cases, it is obvious that the person’s certificate is not an
original birth certificate, prompting any curious individual to
follow the paper trail to their original entry; this, of course,
records the birth parents or sometimes the birth mother
alone. However, these parents may or may not be the child’s
genetic parents, so it seems odd to make this comparison.
Birth parents are recorded because they, unlike most1414 It is important to acknowledge that some gamete providers may
well intend to take a more active role in a child’s life, to include co-
parenting arrangements.gamete providers, are legally responsible for the child at
birth. To record persons with no legal connection or
responsibility for the child would be a very fundamental and
significant change to the birth registration system, and is one
that demands careful consideration in light of the wider
normative context in which birth registration operates.
This leads to my third observation, which is that a
normative narrative of family and kinship relations has always
underpinned the birth registration system, and shaped its
meaning in society. The information recorded by the state –
however partial and prescriptive – is informed by the
normative politics of family life. While the specifics of such
may shift over time, the politics seem to remain tenaciously
informed by gendered perceptions of the two-parent family
model, in which children are deemed to have, at most, two
‘real’ parents (Fineman, 1995; McCandless and Sheldon,
2010). To name gamete providers on a birth certificate,
without first unshackling birth registration from this norma-
tive family model, would, I think, place legal parents who do
not share a genetic connection with their child in a precarious
legal and sociocultural position. Permitting the registration of
more than two legal parents where three parents or more are
collaboratively raising the child may offer one way of
challenging the normative impulses that underpin birth
registration. Indeed, some jurisdictions have already intro-
duced this possibility (e.g. British Columbia). Research
examining the effects of such legal reforms would be
extremely useful in allowing us to reach conclusions on
whether it is possible to unshackle birth registration from
the normative two-parent family model, or whether it simply
re-emerges in different guises.
Either way, it is this normative underpinning which makes
it crucial that any law reform project starts by asking and
attempting to clarify the very basic question of the actual
purpose of birth registration; only then can we determine
what information is appropriate to record. In urging the Law
Commission to consider this preliminary question, I do not
preclude the possibility that we might seek to change the
purpose of birth registration from what it was in historical
terms, or charge it with multiple purposes. However, we do
need to be realistic about what we ask of an administrative
procedure such as birth registration, and what legal reform
can achieve in light of the wider sociolegal context in which
the system operates. In terms of legal context, we cannot
consider the reform of birth registration law without also
considering developments in other substantive areas of law,
such as citizenship and family law.
In my fourth observation, I restrict my comments to
developments in family law, where birth registration has
become an increasingly important social policy tool in relation
to parenting. Section 111 of the Adoption and Children Act
2002 reformed the law so that voluntary joint birth registra-
tion conferred automatic parental responsibility to unmarried
fathers (Sheldon, 2009; Wallbank, 2009), rather than the
father having to come to a parental responsibility agreement
with the legal mother or apply to the court for a parental
responsibility order (Children Act 1989, Section 4). The
Welfare Reform Act 2009, although as yet unimplemented,
makes legislative provision for the compulsory joint registra-
tion of all non-marital births, and amends the Children Act
1989 to automatically confer parental responsibility to
unmarried fathers. With these recent amendments, birth
57registration is no longer regarded in family law as simply a
written legal record or evidence of who a child’s parents were
at the moment of birth, but rather, as a social policy tool that
should facilitate the parent–child relationship through the
conferment of various parental legal rights and entitlements
(McCandless, 2011). Whether a paper certificate can ever
successfully encourage parent–child relationships remains to
be seen, and we should not forget that family law also
prescribes who can be regarded as a legal parent and thus
eligible to be named on a birth certificate. However, these
changes do make us conscious of the role and power of
committing something to paper, and the significance of what
has been described as ‘textually mediated organisation’ by
the state (Breckenridge and Szreter, 2012). This reminds us of
the important role of registration, particularly of vital
information such as births and deaths, in the politics of
modern statecraft, and just as scientific ‘facts’ are never
entirely objective,15 so the information recorded through
processes of registration are never entirely ‘neutral’.
Conclusion
In response to the Law Commission’s consultation question on
whether it should review the law governing the registration of
births, the answer is surely ‘yes’. Legal challenges to the
current system are increasing, and while the context of each
challenge varies, what we see in common across different
contexts is a growing significance being placed on what
individuals regard as subjectively ‘accurate’ information
being recorded, and a desire to have significant life events
‘recognized’. These developments relate, in part, to people’s
individual circumstances and family narratives not being
countenanced in the standardized birth registration proce-
dures and forms, but they also relate to the multiple, and
sometimes competing and contradictory, understandings that
people have of the purpose of birth registration. As birth
certificates are increasingly required for identification, such
challenges are likely to increase, particularly as different
forms of parenting, family life and gender become increas-
ingly visible and acceptable. While some may argue that legal
reform in this area would not benefit a substantial enough
number of people, such would only be true if the Law
Commission was to cast the scope of the project in a narrow
fashion. Underpinning some specific reform questions with a
much wider consideration of the purpose of birth registration
in the contemporary era would be an extremely useful project
for wider society, with implications for everybody given the
compulsory nature of birth registration. While there will
undoubtedly be a huge number of proposals for the 13th
Programme,16 many of which will seemworthy of reform, how
many will involve a compulsory procedure that has remained
fairly stagnant since the early 19th century, despite significant
developments in family life; understandings of gender in
society; and the information which the state holds on
individuals in other administrative, statistical, biometric and
healthcare databases?15 For a discussion on the impossibility of ‘fixing’ a definition of
genetic parenthood, particularly in light of new technologies such as
MitDNA transfer, see McCandless and Sheldon (2014).
16 For 12th Programme, there were 250 suggested areas during the
consultation, leading to nine new projects.There is significant – and really interesting – work to be
done in this area. In legal terms, the past decade has seen a
growing body of academic scholarship on birth registration,
but, like reform, this has been piecemeal. There is plenty of
scope for more sustained considerations, particularly those of
an empirical and comparative nature. Placing birth registra-
tion law on the legal reform agenda would certainly highlight
registration as a serious topic for academic and other
research, and would lead to greater societal understanding
of both the purpose andmeaning of this increasingly important
procedure and ritual in contemporary society.
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